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Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare: Issues and Lessons Learned, Testimony of Dr. David Kilcullen

Title: Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare: Issues and Lessons Learned, Testimony of Dr. David Kilcullen

Date: May 7, 2009

Author: David Kilcullen

Institution: Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, United States House of Representatives

Bibliographic Entry: U.S. House of Representatives.  2009.  Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee.  Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare: Issues and Lessons Learned.  111th Congress.  First Session.

Electronic Link: http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC050709/Kilcullen_Testimony050709.pdf

Key Words: counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, political integration, security integration

Summary of Key Points, Issues, Conclusions: Dr. David Kilcullen’s testimony to the House Armed Services Committee outlines the eight “best practice” facets to successful counterinsurgency operations.  Six of the eight point to the importance of integration efforts: political and military strategies must be intertwined, a region-wide policy must be pursued, and local political and security institutions must be created and edified where possible.  A seventh point is to ensure continuity of key personnel and policies; the eighth, to center security procedures on keeping a heavy presence amongst the population.

Kilcullen notes that the eight tenets should be used when necessary, which may be often during the era of American military supremacy (as enemies do not want to meet the American military in conventional battles).  But he argues that while the tenets of counterinsurgency are widely known and practicable, operations rarely merit the massive costs associated with their proper execution.  Fundamentally, counterinsurgencies are “feasible, but not preferred.”

Name of Researcher: Benjamin Lewellyn

Institution: Integrative Center for Homeland Security, Texas A&M University

Date Posted: June 4, 2009