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Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare: Issues and Lessons Learned, Testimony of Dr. Frederick W. Kagan

Title: Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare: Issues and Lessons Learned, Testimony of Dr. Frederick W. Kagan

Date: May 7, 2009

Author: Frederick W. Kagan

Institution: Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, United States House of Representatives

Bibliographic Entry: U.S. House of Representatives.  2009.  Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee.  Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare: Issues and Lessons Learned.  111th Congress.  First Session.

Electronic Link: http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC050709/Kagan_Testimony050709.pdf

Key Words: counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, counterterrorism, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, strategic flexibility, al Qaeda

Summary of Key Points, Issues, Conclusions: In his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Dr. Frederick Kagan focused on the military component of the US response to its irregular and insurgent enemies but discouraged transformational policy proposals.  First, he cites the US commitment to international law and ethical norms as the chief reasons why counterinsurgencies will continue to be an option for US policymakers—the United States cannot match irregular warfare with irregular warfare.  Second, high-tech and so-called “surgical” strikes have not achieved the objectives intended; efforts in the 1990s to halt al-Qaeda and more recent attempts to curry favor in Pakistan have shown little progress despite the lack of large conventional “footprints.”

Kagan advises policymakers to use the tremendous conventional advantages that the United States possesses to fight irregular enemies, rather than stooping to their level or forsaking the conventional for the high-tech.  He outlines a hopeful program for future Afghanistan policy, but is convinced that there is no suitable answer for “fixing” Pakistan, mostly due to the Pakistani government’s unwillingness to prosecute a counterinsurgency policy seriously.  All of this amounts to a call for strategic flexibility, particularly to remain open to conventional solutions to answer irregular conflict.

Name of Researcher: Benjamin Lewellyn

Institution: Integrative Center for Homeland Security, Texas A&M University

Date Posted: June 4, 2009