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The Lessons of Mumbai
Title: The Lessons of Mumbai
Date: 2009
Author: Angel Rabasa, Robert D. Blackwill, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, C. Christine Fair, Brian A. Jackson, Brian Michael Jenkins, Seth G. Jones, Nathaniel Shestak, Ashley J. Tellis
Institution: RAND Corporation
Bibliographic Entry: Rabasa, Angel et al. “The Lessons of Mumbai.” 2009. RAND Corporation. http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP249.pdf (Accessed January 30, 2009).
Electronic Link: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP249.pdf
Key Words: counterterrorism, firearms assault, mass casualties, intelligence failures, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), India’s 9/11, hostages, terrorist attacks, urban attack, suicide attackers, strategic communications, coastal surveillance, emergency services, target hardening, response protocols
Summary of Key Points, Issues, Conclusions:
This report – drawing heavily from news media reports, identifies the operational features and technical capabilities displayed by the Mumbai terrorists – evaluates the response of the Indian security forces, draws out the implications of the incident for India, Pakistan, and the international community, and identifies the lessons learned from the attack and the Indian response. The Mumbai terrorist attack in November of 2008 was not the first significant terrorist attack in India but it was novel for “its audacious and ambitious scope, the complexity of the operation, and the diversity of its targets.” The attack resulted in the death of 172 people, lasted over 60 hours, and drew massive media attention.
The attacks were believed to be carried out by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a terrorist group based in Pakistan which sees the “Crusader-Zionist-Hindu” alliance as an enemy of Islam. The attackers targeted Britons, Americans, Jews, and Indians but it remains unclear what deaths were indiscriminate killings or planned executions. The report posits that Mumbai was chosen by the terrorists for its proximity to the sea, because of its role as a commercial and entertainment center, and because it is a symbol of Indian prosperity. Likewise, Mumbai hotels were and are filled with foreigners and their deaths would ensure widespread media coverage. The attacks have exacerbated relations between India and Pakistan and may have been intended to spark armed conflict, humiliate India, and bring recruits into the ranks of Kashmiri terrorist groups.
The Mumbai attacks “reflected precise planning, detailed reconnaissance, and thorough preparation, both physical and mental. It relied on surprise, creating confusion and overwhelming the ability of the authorities to respond. And it required determined execution by suicide attackers who nonetheless were able to operate effectively over an extended period of time.” The terrorists landed by sea, used heavy firepower, operated in four teams, took hostages, used barricades, and utilized extensive communication between terrorist members.
The report maintains that the Indian response was sluggish and inefficient because of intelligence failures, gaps in coastal surveillance, inadequate target hardening, incomplete execution of response protocols, response timing problems, inadequate counterterrorism training and equipment, limitations of municipal fire and emergency services, flawed hostage rescue plans, and poor strategic communications. The report concludes by observing that “while the counterterrorism world has been focused almost exclusively on explosives, this attack demonstrates that firearms assault, while not as deadly as mass-casualty bombings, can be an effective tactic in creating prolonged chaos in an urban setting.”
Name of Researcher: Nathan Brown
Institution: Integrative Center for Homeland Security, Texas A&M University
Date Posted: February 4, 2009