2005 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Title: 2005 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Date: November 1, 2005
Author: George Bush
Institution: Homeland Security Council
Bibliographic Entry: George Bush. 2005 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. Homeland Security Council, Washington D.C. November 1, 2005.
Electronic Link: http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/nspi.pdf
Key Words: Pandemic; Influenza; National Strategy; Preparedness; Communication; Surveillance; Detection; Response; Containment; Responsibilities; Roles; WHO; FAO; OIE; APEC; Government; Vaccine; Antiviral; Outbreak; Health; Surge; Infrastructure; Private Sector; Citizen; State; Local; Global
Summary of Key Issues, Points, and Conclusions:
The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza intends to:
- Stop, slow, or otherwise limit the spread of a pandemic to the United States
- Limit the domestic spread of a pandemic, and mitigate disease, suffering and death
- Sustain infrastructure and mitigate impact to the economy and the functioning of society.
The Strategy is guided by the following principles:
- The federal government will use all instruments of national power to address the pandemic threat
- States/communities should have credible pandemic preparedness plans to respond to an outbreak
- Private sector should play an integral role in preparedness before/during/after a pandemic begins
- Citizens should be prepared for flu pandemic, and be educated about individual responsibilities
- Global partnerships will be leveraged to address the pandemic threat.
The pillars of the National Strategy are as follows:
- Preparedness and Communication: Activities that should be undertaken before a pandemic to ensure preparedness, and the communication of roles and responsibilities to all levels of government, segments of society and individuals.
- Surveillance and Detection: Domestic and international systems that provide continuous “situational awareness”, to ensure the earliest warning possible to protect the population.
- Response and Containment: Actions to limit the spread of the outbreak and to mitigate the health, social and economic impacts of a pandemic.
Pillar One: Preparedness and Communication
- Plan for a Pandemic
- Develop federal plans to support this Strategy and to address consequences of a pandemic
- Work with health organizations such as WHO, FAO, OIE and the APEC forum to:
- Support the development and exercising of avian and pandemic response plans
- Expand in-country medical/veterinary/scientific capacity to respond to outbreaks
- Educate people about risky practices that chance interspecies transmission
- Work with states and localities to:
- Establish and exercise pandemic response plans
- Develop medical and veterinary surge capacity plans
- Integrate non-health sectors (private sector and critical infrastructure entities)
- Build way to rapidly recruit/deploy large numbers of health/medical/veterinary providers
- Communicate Expectations and Responsibilities
- Ensure clear/effective/coordinated risk communication before and during a pandemic
- Guide private sector and critical infrastructure on their role in the pandemic response
- Guide people on infection control behaviors they need before/during/after a pandemic
- Guide/support poultry/swine/related industries on role in responding to bird flu outbreaks
- Produce and Stockpile Vaccines, Antivirals and Medical Material
- Encourage nations to develop production capacity and stockpiles to support their needs
- Encourage/subsidize development of state antiviral stockpiles to support flu response
- Ensure that stockpiles are configured to respond to all aspects of a pandemic
- Establish domestic production capacity and stockpiles of countermeasures to ensure:
- Sufficient vaccine for front-line and military personnel, and at-risk populations
- Sufficient vaccine for the entire U.S. population within six months of outbreak
- Antiviral treatment for those who contract a pandemic strain of influenza
- Facilitate appropriate coordination of efforts across the vaccine manufacturing sector
- Address regulatory/legal barriers to expansion of domestic vaccine production capacity
- Expand the public health recommendations for domestic seasonal influenza vaccination
- Expand domestic supply of avian flu vaccine to control an outbreak in bird populations
- Establish Distribution Plans for Vaccines and Antivirals
- Develop credible countermeasure distribution mechanisms for vaccine/antiviral agents
- Prioritize countermeasure allocation before and after an outbreak
- Advance Scientific Knowledge and Accelerate Development
- Ensure sharing of info about flu between governments/scientific entities/private sector
- Work to ensure advanced technological approaches to vaccine production
- Accelerate cell culture technology for flu vaccine production
- Use investment strategies to advance creation of new flu diagnostics/countermeasures
Pillar Two: Surveillance and Detection
- Ensure Rapid Reporting of Outbreaks
- Ensure transparency, scientific cooperation and rapid reporting of avian/human flu cases
- Develop scientific/epidemiologic expertise to ensure early recognition of pattern changes
- Develop/sustain sufficient laboratory capacity/diagnostic reagents in affected regions
- Advance mechanisms for “real-time” clinical surveillance in domestic acute care settings
- Develop/deploy rapid diagnostics to allow onsite diagnosis of pandemic strains of flu
- Expand domestic livestock and wildlife surveillance activities
- Using Surveillance to Limit Spread
- Share info on travelers who may be carrying/exposed to a pandemic strain of influenza
- Develop/exercise mechanisms to provide active/passive surveillance during an outbreak
- Expand/enhance mechanisms for screening/monitoring animals that may harbor viruses
- Screen/monitor/agree to control travel/shipping of potentially infected products
Pillar Three: Response and Containment
- Containing Outbreaks
- Develop a coalition to limit the spread of a virus with pandemic potential
- Offer/coordinate assistance from the United States and other members of Partnership
- Encourage governments to take action to contain an outbreak within borders
- Limit non-essential movement of people/goods/services in flu-affected areas
- Guide government on the range of options for infection-control and containment
- Emphasize roles/responsibilities of the individual in preventing the spread of an outbreak
- Guide states/localities/industry on best practices to prevent spread of flu within birds
- Leveraging National Medical and Public Health Surge Capacity
- Implement state/local/national public health and medical surge plans
- Distribute medical countermeasures from the Strategic National Stockpile to authorities
- Address barriers to the flow of public health, medical and veterinary personnel
- Determine public health/medical/veterinary surge capacity that the military can support
- Sustaining Infrastructure, Essential Services and the Economy
- Develop coordination mechanisms to support the above activities during a pandemic
- Guide activation of contingency plans to ensure personnel are protected, delivery of essential goods and services is maintained, and sectors remain functional
- Determine infrastructure-sustainment activities that the military can support
- Ensuring Effective Risk Communication
- Ensure timely/clear/coordinated messages are delivered to public from trained speakers
- Develop guidelines to assure the public of the safety of the food supply
Roles and Responsibilities
- The Federal Government
- Advance international preparedness, surveillance, response and containment activities
- Support the establishment of countermeasure stockpiles and production capacity by:
- Develop production capacity for vaccine/antiviral/diagnostic/protective gear
- Advance science to produce effective vaccines/therapeutics/diagnostics
- Stockpile and coordinate the distribution of necessary countermeasures
- Ensure that departments/agencies have developed/exercised preparedness/response plans
- Facilitate state and local planning through funding and guidance
- Guide the private sector and public on preparedness and response planning
- States and Localities
- Ensure that measures are taken to limit the spread of an outbreak within/beyond borders
- Establish/exercise comprehensive/credible preparedness/response plans
- Integrate non-health entities in the planning for a pandemic
- Establish state and community-based stockpiles and distribution systems
- Identify key spokespersons for the community
- Provide public education campaigns on pandemic flu and public and private interventions
- The Private Sector and Critical Infrastructure Entities
- Establish an ethic of infection control in the workplace
- Establish contingency system to maintain delivery of essential goods and services
- Establish mechanisms to allow workers to provide services from home, if necessary
- Establish partnerships to provide mutual support and maintenance of essential services
- Individuals and Families
- Take precautions to prevent the spread of infection to others
- Be prepared to follow public health guidance
- Keep supplies at home to support essential needs of the household for several days
- International Partners
- International cooperation to protect the lives and health of our people
- Timely and sustained high-level global political leadership to combat avian/pandemic flu
- Report flu cases in humans/animals caused by virus strains that have pandemic potential
- Immediate sharing of epidemiological data and samples with WHO
- Rapid reaction to first signs of accelerated spread of H5N1/other pathogenic flu strains
- Prevent/contain epidemics through capacity building/collaboration with global partners
- Work to expand cooperation with and support key multilateral organizations
- Coordinate bilateral/multilateral resource allocations; dedicate domestic resources; improve public awareness; and develop economic and trade contingency plans
- Coordination/harmonize preparedness/prevention/response/containment among nations
- Base actions on the best available science
Name of Researcher: Josh Calcote
Institution: Integrative Center for Homeland Security
Date: 11/02/05

